This paper offers analysis of corporate governance issues behind the stock market performance (stock returns and activity) in nine Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Over the period June 1994 -June 2001, on average the CEE stock markets have had lower returns and higher risk than developed markets. This is explained by the negative influence of the two crisis years (1995 and 1998), the "flight to quality" effect. Among other reasons, there are cases when prices have been artificially kept down by the controlling owners in order to abuse the minority shareholders. The evidence shows that the enforcement of law matters more than the quality of law on the books, which is in line with previous research (Pistor et al, 2000). I find that the effectiveness (enforcement) of financial regulations has the highest explanatory power of stock market returns in the sample countries. The protection of minority shareholders (Legal index) has a significant impact on market activity, measured by market turnover to market capitalization ratio.
Introduction
After ten years of transition we have learned that the role of corporate governance is important in the development of capital markets in transition economies. Recent research has found that the level of stock market development may be determined by the quality of shareholder protection and especially law enforcement 1 .
This paper studies the importance of corporate governance issues (rule of law, enforcement, minority shareholder protection, etc.) in determining the level of stock market performance (stock returns and liquidity). This research complements Pistor et.al. (2000) who analyse the demand side of capital. Here I focus on the sypply side of capital, i.e. the potential returns and risk faced by an outside investor. Our results
show that from all the available corporate governance measures, the effectiveness of financial regulations index performs the best in explaining stock market returns in the sample CEE countries. Stock market activity, measured by equity turnover as a share of market capitalization, is significantly dependent on the level of minority shareholder protection (in laws) .
Moreover, this report provides an overview of the development of stock markets during the first ten years of transition. The evidence reveals increasing cross-country return correlation, ownership concentration, as well as lower average returns as compared to the developed stock markets.
The chosen countries should be of interest to European investors and policy makers. In a companion paper (Pajuste & Hogfeldt, 2000) we analyze the influence of macroeconomic and financial risk factors in five CEE countries -Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia -which were, previously, having the "fasttrack" status for joining the European Union (EU). Currently, the line between frontrunners and laggards is not as clear anymore. Other CEE countries have opened accession talks and theoretically could be as fast as the first group if necessary policy adjustments are made. Therefore, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Romania are added. The emergence of stock markets has been associated with the privatization process since most of the listed companies have gone through privatization. The privatization method has considerably influenced the number of listed companies.
Among the nine CEE countries we can distinguish two major types of privatization method 2 . The first method, used in Czech and Slovak Republics, Lithuania and Romania 3 , was the mandatory listing after mass privatization. These countries are characterized with large amount of, often illiquid, listed companies in the beginning and a decrease of number of listed securities afterwards. Once the markets became more established, illiquid shares have been de-listed due to more stringent regulatory framework. 1028  1716  1670  320  304  195  151  135  Hungary  40  42  45  49  55  66  60  58  Estonia  0  0  19  31  29  24  21  16  Latvia  0  17  34  51  68  67  63  66  Lithuania  183  351  460  667  1365  1250  1188  1197  Poland  44  65  83  143  198  221  225  230  Romania  0  9  17  75  126  126  115  na  Slovakia  521  850  970  918  833  830  866  na  Slovenia  85  92  134  154 160 Sources: Homepages of national stock exchanges
The rest of the countries -Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland 4 , and Sloveniachose to start with a small number of listed shares, which was increasing as the markets develop. The shares listed were usually voluntary initial public offerings. Table 1 shows the development of number of shares in the CEE stock markets.
Market Capitalization
By the end of 2000 the stock market capitalization was the highest in Poland (see Table 2 ), followed by Hungary and the Czech Republic. The rest of the stock markets in the region are of a negligible size, partly due to the small size of the country (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia) or poor economic development and regulatory framework (Romania and Slovak Republic). Even the largest CEE stock exchanges are relatively small on a world scale, and if they do not merge or cooperate this can be an obstacle for further development. A large foreign institutional investor is simply too big to spend resources on analyzing markets/ companies where it could become the main owner of a listed companies just in one deal. Some investment funds, for example have a minimum investment size of USD 1 mn which could easily be a controlling stake in many listed companies in these countries.
If we look at the market capitalization as a share of GDP (see Table 3 ), the average figure is 19%. There are only four countries above the 20% level. The highest figure is for Estonia (35%) which is close to the averages in the other emerging 6 markets (e.g. Brazil, Mexico, Turkey), but still far below the developed markets (e.g. US -150%, Germany -50%, Sweden -100%) 5 .
The development of market capitalization again reflects the chosen privatization method. In countries that followed more gradual privatization, equity market capitalization increased slowly (e.g. Poland, Hungary), while in countries with rapid mass privatization, market capitalization jumped to very high levels and then decreased due to de-listing of illiquid companies (e.g. the Czech Republic).
The downward sloping capitalization figures starting from year 2000 have several explanations (see Exhibit II) . First, it has something to do with overall stock market downturn in the world. Second, there is an evidence of continuous de-listings in the transition economies due to stricter listing requirements (e.g. the minimum capital requirement, information disclosure and transparency). The low number of initial public offerings 6 (IPOs) means that the companies still do not believe in the stock market as a real source of external financing. Moreover, as bank loan rates go down, companies prefer to use debt financing, which is cheaper. There is an important indirect cost considered by companies. Listed companies have to provide much more information on a regular basis than unlisted ones, thus being subject to more stringent supervision and scrutiny by the public. As long as this 'discrimination' persists, listed companies will be in an inferior position to their unlisted competitors.
Finally, as we will discuss in the coming paragraphs, there is a tendency of ownership concentration. Most of the countries have already introduced mandatory bid rules 7 , which here implies that a listed company may become 100% owned by one owner, and as a result leave the stock exchange (because one of the listing requirements is that a certain minimum of shares (e.g. 25%) must be in public circulation). 5 The comparative data come from Claessens et al (2000) . 6 Most of the countries in the sample still have not had a single IPO. Poland has had in total 47 IPOs by the end of 2000, which is by far the largest number among CEE countries. 7 An obligation to offer to buy back shares from minority shareholders once a certain threshold is passed. E.g. in Hungary this threshold is 33%+1 share (calculated as percent of voting power), in Latvia -50%. 
Liquidity
The equity market turnover reflects the actual liquidity of the market in question. In turn, market capitalization includes all the listed companies and may be inflated especially in the countries which followed mass privatization with mandatory stock market listing. Therefore, market turnover expressed in US dollars or as a share of market capitalization is a more relevant measure of equity market activity.
As we can see from Table 4 , the highest market turnover in 1998-2000 has been in Poland and Hungary. These figures also reflect the deteriorating situation in the Czech market, which started as the best performer in 1995-1996, was caught by Hungary and Poland in 1997 and decreased rapidly hereafter. The main reason for the Czech market downfall was the lack of adequate corporate governance mechanisms and shirking by closed insider groups and Investment Privatization Funds' managers.
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Looking at market turnover as a share of market capitalization we can see that again only Hungary and Poland has above 100% turnover/ capitalization ratio (see Table 5 ). The Czech market has reached 58% in 2000, but the rest of the countries in the sample have the equity market turnover below 50%. It is interesting to observe the increasing role of debt market. Table 6 shows the decreasing share of equity (i.e. increasing share of debt 9 ) market contribution in the total market turnover. The average stock market returns in the CEE countries (see Table 8 ), with an exception of Hungary, has been below the returns on government securities. Naturally, the investors are using the traditional 'safe heaven' strategy widely known in the western markets, i.e. in times of turbulence and instability investors reduce the holdings of stocks and increase fixed income instruments (such as T-bills, government bonds and corporate bonds). 
Increasing ownership concentration
An empirical study on ownership structure in the CEE countries reveals a strong ownership concentration (see Table 7 ). Since most of the countries use one-share one-vote mechanism, the capital stakes (rights to dividends) are mostly the same as voting power. Moreover, pyramidal structures and cross-company linkages are really hard to observe and prove in the CEE markets unless owners themselves report their ultimate holding. A typical example, the largest owner is a corporation and the second largest -an insider (CEO or manager), who owns a direct or indirect stake in the abovementioned corporation.
Unless the interest is clearly visible or the owners report the linkages, the minority shareholders do not explicitly see the joint voting power. Therefore, we can presume that the actual ownership concentration is even higher. Becht and Mayer (2000) .
the regulatory framework and poor enforcement mechanism in many cases has lead to a "winner-take-all" situation 11 , meaning that only the controlling owners have some influence over the managers and company policy.
Once minority shareholders loose the confidence and patience to stay with the company they sell their shares to the controlling group, usually at deflated prices. The company needs additional capital for development. Since it is hard to attract new minority shareholders or to make a public offer, the existing owners have to provide private capital. To inject the private capital, the potential owner usually requires some sort of control over the operations and strategic decisions, because exit is not so easy.
Moreover, gain in terms of share price appreciation is hard to expect, therefore the only way to gain from the investment is dividends or selling the company (or ownership block). Dividend decisions can be influenced only if the owner has a say in the management board. And to sell the shares, it is more attractive to have a significant block of shares (together with control benefits). An instructive example is the situation in the Czech and Slovak Republics where investment funds made their money on collecting blocks in the off-market trades.
Lower average returns Table 8 shows analysis of the returns on nine local stock indices and compares these with other emerging and developed markets 12 . Over the last 7 years on average the local stock market indices in nine CEE countries, as well as the composite emerging market index (MSCI Free), have had lower average returns than developed markets. Hungary is the only CEE country that has been close to the World index.
Romania has been the worst performing country, with a negative average monthly return (in USD) of -3.8%, primarily attributable to the local currency depreciation. 
12
One explanation for lower returns again goes back to the ownership concentration and minority shareholder expropriation issues. If we believe that there are private benefits of control in the CEE markets (tunneling of resources to related companies or pure shirking by controlling party), the controlling owners are not interested in share price appreciation. Rather, the opposite could be true.
An illustrative example is a Latvian company "Ventspils Nafta" operating primarily with transit and storage of oil products. The largest owner (47% of capital)
is a private company, LNT, also operating in oil business. The second largest owner is the state (43.6%), which will sell its shares in the nearest future. Moreover, there is an agreement that 5% of the company capital (currently owned by the state) is reserved for the largest owner, LNT. As a result, the share price is artificially kept below the true value (market price of equity currently is only 30% of the book value of equity), because the largest owner will have to buy the promised 5% at the stock market price on the date of the deal.
Higher risk
As expected, CEE markets are associated with higher risk (standard deviation).
The highest risk has been observed in Latvia, with standard deviation of monthly returns equal to 14.5%, and the lowest in Slovakia (7.3%). Thus, remarkably, we see a negative relationship between risk and return across a selection of emerging and developed markets. Western Europe. This tendency, therefore, increases the demand for safe-haven stocks, and naturally the stock returns in those countries rise. In the other years, the risk-return relationship reverts to the expected higher return -higher risk mix.
High correlation among CEE markets and Europe
The correlation of monthly returns between the nine emerging markets as well as the average correlation of each of the nine CEE country returns with the MSCI world index, MSCI Europe index and Emerging Markets Free MSCI index (all USD based) are presented in Table 9 . Higher correlation between the markets is usually taken as a measure of the cross-country integration level, i.e. if the correlation is higher the markets are more globally integrated and tend to react similarly to global events. The correlation among the Central European markets (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), as well as with the Western Europe, is higher than normally reported in cross-country correlations among emerging markets globally.
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Notes: The following stock indices are used as proxies for each country (region): Czech -PX50, Hungary -BUX, Poland -WIG, Slovenia -SBI20, Estonia -TALSE, Latvia -DJRSE, Lithuania -LITIN-G, Romania -Vanguard VAB, Slovakia -SAX, Europe -MSCI Europe, Russia -Moscow Times index, EMBI -JP Morgan Emerging markets bond index EMBI+, Emerging -MSCI Emerging Free, World -MSCI World, Germany -DAX. All indices are USD based.
As we can see from the Table 9 , all three Central European countries (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) are highly correlated. Also the stock markets in the three Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) are highly correlated, though to a lesser extent than their Central European counterparts. This pattern shows that regional proximity matters, and especially if linked with close trade relations.
Hungary's stock index has showed the highest positive correlation with all the European, emerging market and world indices. So, from this perspective it is the most integrated of the CEE markets. Poland and the Czech Republic follow, also revealing strong positive correlation with world, European and general emerging market indices. Interestingly, before the crisis (June 1994 to July 1998) the Czech Republic had even a negative correlation with these indices. Now the correlation is significantly positive. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). **.
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). *. 
Increased CEE market Integration within European markets
The previous section presented the average correlations over the whole period of study, which is a static approach. However, an interesting question is whether integration towards the EU (harmonization of legal, structural and policy matters) is seen in the development of the CEE stock markets. The hypothesis would be that there should be higher correlation with EU stock markets in recent years. with the European index is the common fact that stock market returns tend to move more in lock step in a decline than in a boom. Arguably, the Russian crisis also had a negative effect on the Western European stock markets.
Another observation from the graphs is true increasing trend in the correlations between the CEE country indices and the European index starting from mid-2000.
Again there are two exceptions, namely Latvia and Lithuania. The recent increase in correlations between the CEE and European indices reflect the global stock market 13 The dynamics of the importance of European risk factors is analyzed using the rolling 12-month correlations of local returns (in USD) with the European aggregate stock index returns (MSCI Europe, USD based).
downturn, which has had a negative influence both in the Western and Eastern
Europe.
To conclude, we can note that the CEE countries are becoming more integrated within the European capital markets in a sense that they do react to, especially negative, market mood in the rest of Europe and the world. The increasing correlations over time indicate that cross-country diversification benefits are decreasing. Will they disappear? The answer is no: for the overwhelming majority of listed firms, the domestic market will be most important, and local risk factors are likely to determine most of the relationship between risk and return in the CEEs, before and after EU membership. In particular, differences in political cultures, tax and legal systems, and socio-demographic developments are likely to persist for the foreseeable future despite harmonization.
Financial and Political risk factors
The previous section presented an overview of the stock market development and particularly the return characteristics in the sample CEE countries. This chapter will focus on some answers to the question which risk factors determine the nature of stock returns in these countries.
In Hogfeldt & Pajuste (2000) we analyze three broad sources of risk: macroeconomic and financial risk factors (such as currency fluctuations, foreign reserves, inflation), political and legal events, and institutional factors. This paper is devoted mainly to the institutional factors -corporate governance issues, which will be discussed in the next section. Nevertheless, here I will briefly recap on previous findings about the role of fundamentals in determining stock market returns.
Previous studies have shown that in emerging countries, the risk factors mostly originate in the local environment (see Harvey (1995) and references thereafter). This phenomenon is usually explained by the fact that emerging markets are to an extent segmented from the world markets. Developed markets are much more integrated and tend to be influenced by worldwide risk factors, such as US market sentiment, oil prices, global currency fluctuations, and so on.
Claessens et al (2000) find some evidence that higher macroeconomic stability (proxied by inflation and GDP per capita) during the period of transition has a positive impact on stock market development (measured by market capitalization as a share of GDP). The results suggest that investors are more sensitive to negative news than to positive news, perhaps a typical reaction for emerging markets. Emerging markets are "by definition" characterized by higher risks, so investors might exaggerate the extent and seriousness of a negative event. For example, a change of government does not usually influence stock market returns in developed countries, but in emerging markets the same event often has more influence on stock prices. The government change may bring, first, a government crisis which would then be defined as a negative event, and the stock market would react negatively because of perceived instability and uncertainty. Or, this may be a positive event if the previous government has been inefficient and the perception is that any replacement will improve the situation.
Another factor beyond the control of the country is its size. As Claessens et al (2000) argue, the size of a market will play a large role in the perspective of stock market viability. If there are only a few large companies suited for public listing (like in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Romania), the question of a long-term existence of an independent local stock market becomes an issue. The economies of scale are still alive -the recent cross-border mergers of large stock exchanges show that costs of running a stock exchange may become high (technology, trading systems, analysis, etc.). Therefore, it is quite realistic that the experiment of small, local stock exchanges will end as they are 'eaten up' by the larger regional exchanges.
Already now larger CEE companies prefer to list in the foreign exchanges, so the consolidation of regional stock markets is just a matter of time.
Corporate Governance and Stock Market returns
Numerous recent studies on transition economies have emphasized the relevance of law, judicial efficiency, corporate governance and the regulatory framework 16 .
Moreover, it has been shown that the enforcement of law and regulations has much 19 higher explanatory power for the level of equity and credit market development than the quality of the law on the books, see Pistor et al (2000) and Coffee (1999) .
One of the earlier corporate governance papers by LLSV argued that the common law countries have better minority shareholder protection than the civil law countries (see e.g. LLSV, 1997). That does not help very much in explaining anything about the stock markets in the sample CEE countries since most of them are based on civil law practice, particularly, German civil law. More applicable hypothesis is presented by Coffee (1999) who notes that the differences in corporate law may be less important than the differences in the level of regulation that different countries impose on their securities markets.
The different methods and speed of security market supervision chosen by the CEE countries explain some of the variation in stock returns. An instructive, but by now probably worn-out example, is the contrast between the Czech Republic and
Poland (Johnson & Shleifer, 2000 , Coffee, 1999 ) until late 1999. From similar starting points (early privatization, successful reforms, economic stability), the three most advanced CEE countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, showed significantly different stock market performance (see for example, Table 4 16 See e.g. Lombardo and Pagano (1999 ), Pistor (1999 , Coffee (1999) , LLSV (1997 LLSV ( , 1999 , Johnson and Shleifer (2000) , Johnson et al (1998) . 17 The EU directive of 12 December 1988 "On the information to be published when a major holding in a listed company is acquired or disposed of" (88/627/EEC) generally aims to provide investors with explicit information on the voting power in the listed companies. See Olsson (2001) for a detailed assessment of implementation of Large Holdings Directive in the CEE countries.
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Development of the stock market regulations
The nine CEE countries can be classified into four groups according to the way they have proceeded with the capital market regulations (see Table 10 ). The first group includes Poland and Hungary, who have both chosen strict regulatory mechanisms aimed at investor protection from management or large blockholder fraud. These two countries have also put considerable effort into enforcement mechanisms, often the most deficient part of the legal framework in transition economies. Comparing these two countries, Hungary has weaker regulation than
Poland, but its stock market performance is boosted by the specific choice of privatization method, that is relying heavily on sales of controlling stakes to foreigners. This method has increased foreign control of local companies and interest in these stocks, and brought more liquidity to the market due to the presence of larger number of wealthy investors. in January 1999 were foreign banks allowed to establish branches in Slovenia, and only in July 1999 were branches and subsidiaries of foreign securities firms allowed to enter the market. As a result, even though the level of institutional and technical development of the stock market in Slovenia is quite advanced, the local market remains segmented from the world market due to capital market restrictions and a "semi-socialistic" corporate governance structure (employee and state control).
The importance of corporate governance factors
In general, CEE corporate governance mechanisms have improved over the last We can see from the Table 11 that the minority shareholder protection has strengthened in the period from 1994 to 1998. The country with the highest level of legal protection of minority shareholders in 1998 was Estonia, followed by Poland, Slovenia and Hungary. The Slovak Republic came in last. To assess the effect of the level of the Legal index on the stock market returns I run a simple one-to-one OLS regression. The average returns over 1995 19 , 1996-1997 and 1998-1999 are regressed on the Legal index at the end of 1994, 1996 and 1998, respectively. As Exhibit VI, Figure A (see annex) reveals, a higher Legal index has a positive, though not very significant, effect on stock market returns in the sample countries (the adjusted R 2 is 6.5%).
The market capitalization to GDP ratio as a dependent variable was not significant, which is not surprising. The market capitalization does not reflect the real situation as it includes many illiquid shares (e.g. in Slovakia, Lithuania, Romania).
More meaningful measure of market activity is the market turnover as a percent of market capitalization (see Table 5 ). The average turnover over 1995, 1996-1997 and 1998-1999 is regressed on Legal index at the end of 1994, 1996 and 1998, respectively. As Exhibit VI, Figure B (see annex) shows, a higher Legal index has a 23 significant positive effect on the stock market activity in the sample countries (the adjusted R 2 is 34%).
As noted earlier, the enforcement of laws and regulations (effectiveness) in the transition economies usually lags behind the quality of law (extensiveness). This pattern is clearly seen from the Table 12 The financial regulations effectiveness, i.e. enforcement, has the highest power Commercial law indices were not significant.
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Financial regulations (FR) effectiveness had a high explanatory power on stock market activity, too. FR effectiveness index explains 22% of the variation in market turnover (as percent of market capitalization) among the sample CEE countries.
As a caveat one should still keep in mind that the aggregate indices used in the quantitative analysis presented above are rather subjective and often not hundred percent correct. Nevertheless, the role of financial regulations and their enforcement has been arguably important. Why 'has been' and not 'is'? The situation is changing and as most of the CEE countries close chapter after chapter in their accession talks to the EU, the regulatory framework becomes more in line with the western standards. I find three explanation for the stock market decline in the CEE. First, as already mentioned, is the increasing ownership concentration, i.e. not enough shares in public circulation. Moreover, the control concentration very often is linked to the extraction of private benefits. As a result, the controlling owner has no interest in increasing the stock market value of a company because the returns are generated elsewhere.
Second reason could be an increasing role of debt financing from banks or other corporations. Finally, the local market activity is reduced by the tendency of big companies to list on the foreign exchanges. As they need large capital resources which are hard to raise locally, they seek (and find) equity financing abroad.
Conclusions
The main contribution of this paper is the comparative approach on the Central and Eastern European stock markets after the first decade of transition. Keeping in mind that all the countries in the sample are sooner or later heading towards the EU, the issue of the role of the local stock markets is important.
The results show that during the last seven years, the CEE stock markets have brought the investors lower returns than in the developed markets, partly because of the local currency depreciation. Moreover, the volatility of returns has been higher.
Resultantly, this risk-return relation should scare away any rational investor. Why still 
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